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Courts-Constitutional Law-Power of Congress to Diminish the
Retired Salaries of Federal Judges.
Plaintiffs, retired judges of a circuit and district federal court
respectively, bring separate suits to recover a portion of their salaries,
which had been withheld pursuant to an act of congress providing
for a 15 per cent reduction in the retired pay of judges, "whose pay
prior to retirement could not have been diminished under the Con-
stitution." Plaintiffs contend that such act is in violation of Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which forbids diminution of the
compensation of federal judges during their continuance in office.'
Held, judgment for plaintiffs. A federal judge does noth relinquish
his office by retiremnent and the reduction of retired pay ag provided
for in that act is unconstitutional.
2
The constitutional provision forbidding diminution of judicial
salaries applies only to officers of constitutional courts created by
congress by virtue of the power given it in Article III, Section 1.3
It is not applicable to those of legislative courts created by virtue of
the power delegated to congress in other constitutional provisions.
4
Concededly the courts involved in the instant case belong to the
former class, and plaintiffs' salaries before retirement could not have
been reduced.5
The underlying principle behind the provision and decisions up-
holding it is deduced from the Constitution itself which sets up three
branches of government essentially separate and independent, with
neither department possessing an overruling influence in the admin-
istration of their respective powers. 6 So careful have the courts
bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."); Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 198, 65 L. ed. 877, 888, 41 Sup.
Ct. 465, 466 (1921) (in sustaining the New York rent legislation as a valid
exercise of police power the court said: ". . . contracts are made subject to
this exercise of the power of the State when otherwise justified. .... ).
'The North Carolina constitution contains a similar provision. N. C.
CoNsT. (1868) ART. IV §18.
2Booth v. United States, Amidon v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 379, 78 L.
ed. 464 (1934).
' O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 53 Sup. Ct. 740, 77 L. ed.
1356 (1933) ; (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 318.
'American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1828); ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct. 411, 73 L. ed. 789 (1929) ; Williams v. United
States, 289 U. S. 553, 53 Sup. Ct. 751, 77 L. ed. 1372 (1933).
'Supra note 3.
'State v. Porter, 57 Mont. 343, 188 Pac. 375 (1920) ; In Re Taxation of
Judges' Salaries, 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970 (1902) ; Long v. Watts, 183 N. C.
99, 110 S. E. 765 (1922) ; cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 48
Sup. Ct 480, 72 L. ed. 845 (1927).
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been to preserve this protection that state as well as federal courts
have repeatedly held judges' salaries exempt from taxation on the
theory that the "power to tax is the power to destroy."7 It is diffi-
cult to see how an income tax, a burden which is borne by all citizens
alike, as distinguished from an occupational tax on the judiciary
alone, is a menace to the independence or existence of the judiciary,8
and one court proceeds on this theory in holding judges' salaries sub-
ject to income taxes.0
The most extreme holdings, however, deal with the situation that
arises where no legislative appropriation is made for judges' salaries.
Some courts have gone as far as to hold legislative appropriations
authorizifig payment of such salaries unnecessary where the consti-
tution prohibits their increase or diminution, on the theory that such
provision is self-executing and exz proprio vigore makes the necessary
appropriation by law,10 although the majority view is that such ap-
propriation is required before the salaries can be drawn."
It is submitted that the court in the principal case has enforced
the rule where the reason no longer exists. While an independent
judiciary is to be desired and jealously guarded, it would seem un-
necessary to maintain an expensive safeguard where judicial inde-
pendence is not threatened.' 2 Under the federal retirement statute
it is clear that a retired judge cannot be forced to undertake any duty
unwillingly. Under no circumstances is his duty after retirement
obligatory.' 3 It would seem then that the court has taken a step,
'Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. ed. 887 (1920); New
Orleans v. Lee, 14 La. Ann. 197 (1859); Purnell v. Page, 133 N. C. 125. 45
S. E. 534 (1903) ; Long v. Watts, supra note 6.
'State v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 N. W. 512 (1915) ; see Evans v. Gore,
sipra note 7 (dissent of Holmes, J.). Art. IV §12 of the proposed constitution
for North Carolina provides that "the general assembly shall regulate ...
salaries of all officers . . .but the salaries of justices of the Supreme Court
and judges of the superior courts shall not be diminished except by tax levies
common to others during the time for which they shall have been elected."
'Taylor v. Gelner, 329 Mo. 511, 45 S. W. (2d) 59 (1931) (As regards the
constitutional provision prohibiting diminution of judges' salaries, the court
said, "the section was never intended as a limitation on the taxing power.").
10 State v. Hickman, 10 Mont. 497, 26 Pac. 386 (1891) ; Riley v. Carter, 25
Pac. (2d) 666 (Okla. 1933) commented upon (1934) 22 GEo. L. J. 376.
" Meyers v. English, 9 Cal. 341 (1858) ; In Re Groff, 21 Nebr. 647, 33 N.
W. 426 (1887).
'- State v. Porter, supra note 6 (the principles underlying the constitutional
provision were given effect and although the constitution of Montana prohibited
increase or diminution, the court allowed an increase in judges' salaries on the
theory that as the reason for the rule ceases, so does the rule itself).
"40 STAT. 1156, 1157 (1919) 28 U. S. C. A. §375 (1926) (".... but instead
of resigning, any judge other than a justice of the Supreme Court . . .may
retire upon the salary of which he is then in receipt, from regular active serv-
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the direction of which is decidedly questionable, when it holds that a
retired judge is still in office to such an extent that a diminution after
an increase is banned, notwithstanding the reduced salary remains in
excess of the salary payable when the incumbent took office. Fur-
thermore, the provision in that aci for the appointment of a suc-
cessor, who would be in fact in office, and whose "subsistence" could
not be controlled by the legislature, would seem to be inconsistent
with the theory that his predecessor was still "in office,"'1 4 and would
seem to furnish adequate comfort to those who fear for the inde-
pendence of our judiciary.
The wisdom of such a decision is rendered more doubtful in view
of the emergency which prompted the legislation diminishing the re-
tired pay of federal judges. "The interpretation of constitutional
provisions is to be made in view of the history of the times, the evil
to be remedied, and the purpose to be accomplished,"' 5-a timely
rule of construction which the court in the instant case seems to have
ignored.
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.
Criminal Law-Effect of a Plea of Nolo Contendere.
The defendant was convicted in New Jersey under a plea of nolo
contendere to an indictment for false pretense. He was subsequently
convicted in New York on a plea of guilty to an indictment for
forgery, and, on information brought of the former conviction, was
sentenced under the second offender statute. On appeal, held, that
a conviction under a plea of nolo contendere is not such a conviction
as to come within the contemplation of the second offender statute.'
The plea of nolo contendere is of common-law origin,2 and may
ice on the bench, and the President shall ... appoint a successor; ... but a
judge so retiring may nevertheless be called upon by the senior circuit judge
of his circuit and be by him authorized to perform such judicial duties
as such retired judge may be willing to undertake.. ").
1'Supra note 13; cf. Board v. Lee, 76 N. J. L. 327, 70 Atl. 925 (1908) (The
court said, "to assert that a term of office of a deceased or an impeached officer
continues, is to assert that there may be two terms of office running together,
although the office can be filled but by a single person." It would seem that
the same could be said of a resigning or retiring judge.) ; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §3884a (North Carolina retirement statute). Investigation dis-
closes no North Carolina cases similar to the principal one where judges, re-
tired pursuant to that statute, bring action to recover a portion of their salaries
withheld by the state.
Fargo v. Powers, 220 Fed. 217 (E. D. Mich. 1914).
People v. Daiboch, 269 N. Y. S. 321 (1934). (Three-to-two decision.)
2 Hudson v. U. S. 272 U. S. 451, 47 Sup. Ct. 127, 71 L. ed. 347 (1926);
Tucker v. U. S., 196 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) ; Regina v. Templeman, 1
